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Introduction 
With the apparent lack of progress and success in Afghanistan, coun-
ter-insurgency (COIN), both as a theory and practice, is falling out of 
favor within the political and military establishment in the US. This 
comes at a time when the US is redirecting its geopolitical focus away 
from global instability towards the Asia-Pacific and the ‘New Great 
Power Game’.  
 
The 2012 US Defense Strategic Guidance clearly states that the US 
forces ‘no longer will be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged sta-
bility operations’ like the ones in Iraq and Afghanistan. Instead, they 
will ‘emphasize non-military means and military-to-military coopera-
tion to address instability and reduce the demand for significant U.S. 
force commitments to stability operations.’ It goes on to explain that 
they will be ready to conduct limited COIN operations if required, but 
emphasize that this will mostly be done by operating alongside coali-
tion forces, meaning that ‘helping others defend themselves’ will be 
the new mantra for reducing instability around the world.1  In essence, 
the 2012 Strategic Guidance calls for an end to COIN operations. In 
addition to this, the operations in Afghanistan have taken on a new 
phase that focus primarily on capture/kill operations and Foreign In-
ternal Defense (FID), so-called ‘COIN-lite’, rather than population 
security, good governance and nation-building.  
  
Although this points to the demise of COIN as policy and military 
practice, the US military is currently re-writing its COIN doctrine and 
the Defense Strategic Guidance points to the need to ‘retain and con-
tinue to refine the lessons learned, expertise and specialized capabili-
ties that have been developed’2 over the past decade in Iraq and Af-
ghanistan.  
 
While counterinsurgency seems to have fallen out of grace due to the 
apparent lack of success in Afghanistan and Iraq, one should maybe 
not be as quick to throw the baby out with the bath water. COIN theo-
ry in itself may not be at fault for the lack of results. Regardless of the 
desire not to engage in lengthy, large-scale stability operations, history 
tells us that, expertise and specialized capabilities to conduct such op-
erations will be needed in the future.  
  
Through analyzing and comparing COIN as theory and COIN in prac-
tice this article seeks to understand what can be drawn from existing 
                                                 
1  Department of Defense (2012), Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st 
Century Defence, January 2012, Washington DC, January 2012, p. 6. 
2  Department of Defense (2012), p. 6. 
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theory and from its critics in order to inform how COIN can be re-
vised to guide future stability and counter-insurgency operations. 
While this article will not offer any panaceas for counter-insurgency 
operations, it will be argued that a focus on stakeholders in the con-
flict rather than on the population or the enemy is a better approach 
for countering insurgencies and ensuring long-term stability in war-
torn states. 
COIN in Theory3 
When what started as a conventional war turned irregular in late 2003 
after the invasion of Iraq there were no updated doctrine available to 
turn to when faced with a growing insurgency. The US Army and Ma-
rine Corps were organized, trained and equipped for fighting conven-
tional wars against regular enemies. From fighting its preferred wars 
against formed units in the open the US now were faced with individ-
ual enemies fighting in and from the shadows. This deficit had to be 
remedied quickly and the work caught momentum when Lieutenant-
General David Petreaus returned from his second tour of duty in Iraq 
in October 2005 to take command of the Combined Arms Center 
(CAC) in Fort Leavenworth. He soon collected a group of competent 
personnel to start working on a revised COIN doctrine4 and at the 
same time built a strong rapport with his US Marines counterpart 
Lieutenant-General James Mattis.5 In December 2006, the new doc-
trine was published as a combined US Army and US Marines product, 
and it immediately had an impact on the conduct of operations in Iraq 
as well as on education and training in the US Army. This article take 
as a point of departure COIN theory as it is presented in the U.S doc-
trine FM 3-24. 
 
The role of doctrines varies from country to country. In an ideal 
world, doctrines would drive decisions on how the armed forces of a 
country should be organized, what missions it should train to accom-
plish, and what equipment it needs.6 This in turn points towards a pre-
scriptive role of doctrines. In the US military in general and in the US 
Army in particular, doctrines are very important and come close to 
this ideal especially since the establishment of the Army’s Training 
and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) in 1973 and the pursuant issue of 
the famous Air Land Battle doctrine of 1982. In other countries, like 
Norway, doctrines do not have the same tradition and roles. The Nor-
                                                 
3  In the following the acronym COIN will refer to the doctrine (FM 3-24) and its theory, 
recommendations and principles. The term counter-insurgency will refer to the phenome-
non of countering an insurgency in general. 
4  An interim COIN doctrine was issued in October 2004 as Field Manual (Interim) 3-07.22. 
5  John Nagl, ‘The Evolution and Importance of the Army/ Marine Corps Field Manual 3-
24, Counterinsurgency’, U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Foreword, pp., xv-xvi, Counterin-
surgency, FM 3-24/MCWP (Chicago, University of Chicago Press: 2007).   
6  Foreword, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24/MCWP, p. xiv. 
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wegian Joint Doctrine leans more to the descriptive side of a descrip-
tive-prescriptive scale. Within the Norwegian Armed Forces, doctrine 
is not something you bring with you to the battlefield or conflict area 
but something you use in your education and preparation for deploy-
ment. Doctrine is not about how to conduct war and military opera-
tions but how to think about war and operations and only to a very 
limited degree guides equipment procurement. The US doctrines have 
however, tended to be more like guidelines to help the commanders at 
all levels in their actual conduct of operations as well as guiding the 
structuring and training of the Force – thus more on the prescriptive 
side. The FM 3-24 appears to have taken a step towards the descrip-
tive side compared to previous US doctrines. But, the impact the doc-
trine have had on the organization, training and hardware of the US 
Army still points towards a strong prescriptive role. A central impera-
tive of COIN as presented in FM 3-24 is to learn and adapt.7 ‘In 
COIN, the side that learns faster and adapts more rapidly – the better 
learning organization – usually wins’.8 It would seem that a doctrine 
that is too prescriptive in its guidance to the actual conduct of opera-
tions  would inhibit learning and adapting while a more descriptive 
one better allows for this. In this chapter we will analyze COIN theory 
and FM 3-24 against recent practice as prescriptive theory rather than 
descriptive. 
What is an Insurgency? 
An insurgency is first and foremost a struggle for the political power 
over the allegiance of the population in a given territory. It is a method 
employed by a non-state actor to challenge the existing political au-
thority. According to FM 3-24 an insurgency is about the overthrow of 
a government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.9 This 
is a narrow definition that excludes armed conflicts like the Tamil Ti-
gers’ fight against the Sri Lankan Government for a separate state. Ac-
tually the FM 3-24 is somewhat ambivalent in its description of what 
an insurgency is, as it also states: ‘an insurgency is an organized, pro-
tracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the control and 
legitimacy of an established government, occupying power, or other 
political authority while increasing insurgent control’.10 If to weaken 
the control and legitimacy of the government is included as the aim of 
insurgents, it would significantly expand the scope of cases that can be 
included in the insurgency category. 
 
                                                 
 7  U.S. Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24/MCWP (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press: 2007), p. 46. 
 8  FM 3-24, p. ix. 
 9  FM 3-24, p. 2.  
10  FM 3-24, p. 2.   
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What separates insurgents from criminals is primarily the political aim 
of the insurgents and it is their means and ways what separates them 
from terrorists. Organized crime is purely parasitic, their only aim is 
self-aggrandizement, and they do not serve a constituency other than 
themselves.11 Although insurgents and terrorists sometimes employ 
similar methods (for example suicide bombings), the main difference 
lies in their size and organization. Both groups are fighting a political 
struggle but the insurgent's main method of armed struggle is through 
guerilla warfare primarily against enemy military forces. A terrorist 
group on the other hand is normally numerically too small to wage a 
guerilla war. They seldom operate as more than a handful in each ac-
tion and their targets are primarily civilian. Unlike an insurgent group 
they are neither able nor willing to seize and hold territory and to ex-
ercise some form of control over a defined territory.12 
What is COIN? 
There is no generally agreed upon definition of counter-insurgency. 
FM 3-24 states that ‘Counterinsurgency is military, paramilitary, polit-
ical, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a govern-
ment to defeat insurgency’.13 As such it is simply ‘an umbrella term 
that describes the complete range of measures that governments take 
to defeat insurgencies.’14   
 
All insurgencies are sui generis – of its own kind – and there are nu-
merous ways to defeat them. In order to find the most appropriate way 
of conducting a specific counter-insurgency operation, one must un-
derstand each particular conflict with reference to three defining fac-
tors; the nature of the insurgency being countered, the nature of the 
government being supported, and the environment – especially the 
human environment – in which the conflict takes place.15 
 
This article focuses on counter-insurgency waged by external forces in 
support of a Host Nation (HN) government. There is a clear distinc-
tion between a counter-insurgency waged by a local government 
against domestic insurgents and counter-insurgency mainly fought by 
external, foreign forces supporting a Host Nation Government. The 
struggle for legitimacy, a centerpiece in FM 3-24, is considerably 
more difficult for foreigners, particularly if they are of a different eth-
nicity, religion or culture. The challenge for external forces is that 
                                                 
11  Harald Håvoll, COIN Revisited: Lessons of the Classical Literature on Counter-
Insurgency and its applicability to the Afghan Hybrid Insurgency, Oslo, NUPI, 2008, Se-
curity in Practice no 13, p. 6. 
12  Bruce, Hoffman, ‘Terrorism Defined’, in R. Howard & R. Sawyer (eds.), Terrorism and 
Counterterrorism (place of publication: name of publisher 2002), p. 22. 
13  FM 3-24, p. 2. 
14  David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (London: Hurst & Company, 2010), p. 1. 
15  Kilcullen (2010) p. 2. 
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counter-insurgency is a protracted struggle and what might have been 
a positive attitude among the local populace at the outset may wear 
thin with time especially if no apparent progress is produced. Eventu-
ally their legitimacy may crumble and what was once seen as libera-
tors may be regarded as occupiers.  
 
‘Victory’ in COIN is an elusive concept. It is very difficult to define 
what constitutes success and how to know when an end state has been 
reached. Some would claim that annihilation of the insurgents is the 
goal, while others assert that success is when the insurgency has be-
come ‘manageable’ by the government. Yet, others would hold that 
the best we can hope for is to change an old process into a new one.16 
According to FM 3-24 victory is achieved ‘when the populace con-
sents to the government’s legitimacy and stops actively and passively 
supporting the insurgency.’17  
 
Success depends on the goals set by the politicians, but the field man-
ual suggests that to ‘defeat’ an insurgency, the purpose is to address 
the underlying conditions for the insurgency. This is to be done 
through reforming and strengthening the existing political order so it 
will be seen as legitimate in the eyes of the population. The ability of 
a political authority to deliver public goods thus becomes an integral 
part of the strategic objective to make the Host Nation capable of gov-
ern and secure itself. This refers to the need for reforming the Host 
Nation, something that requires the coordinated efforts of the whole 
range of political tools available to the counter-insurgents. 
 
For an intervening force the purpose necessarily includes national in-
terests. They share the goal of a sustainable stability by a Host Nation 
government able to govern and secure itself, but the purpose of this 
stability for an external actor is to prevent local and regional instabil-
ity and to ensure future threats to its interests do not emanate from that 
state, something that will allow them to exit. 
 
The field manual defines legitimacy as the primary objective of any 
COIN operation. ‘A COIN effort cannot achieve lasting success with-
out the HN government achieving legitimacy’.18 Long-terms success 
‘depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consent-
ing to the government’s rule’.19 As such, COIN puts the population at 
the center of its strategy in order to achieve its end state of a legitimate 
Host Nation government able to govern and secure itself. The manual 
                                                 
16  Robert B. Polk (2007), ‘Interagency Reform: An Idea Whose Time Has Come’, in  Joseph 
R. Cerami, and Jay W. Boggs (eds.) (2007), The Interagency and Counterinsurgency 
Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction Roles, (Pennsylvania: Strate-
gic Studies Institute, US Army War College) , December 2007, p. 319.  
17  FM 3-24, p. 6. 
18  FM 3-24, p. 39. 
19  FM 3-24, p. 2. 
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thus frames counter-insurgencies as contests for legitimacy between 
the insurgents and the counter-insurgents. ‘At its core, COIN is a 
struggle for the population’s support’.20 ‘Political power is the central 
issue in insurgencies and counter-insurgencies; each side aims to get 
the people to accept its governance or authority as legitimate’.21 
 
Though legitimacy is not directly defined in the manual, it describes 
legitimate governments as those that rule with consent of the governed 
while illegitimate ones rely mainly on coercion to keep control of its 
population.22 The emphasis on legitimacy as the main objective of any 
COIN operation is based on the idea that legitimate governance is in-
herently stable as ‘the societal support it engenders allows them to ad-
equately manage internal problems, change, and conflict that affect 
individual and collective well-being.’ This is contrasted to illegitimate 
states that are seen as inherently unstable and unable to regulate socie-
ty or can only do so by applying overwhelming coercion.23 In essence, 
COIN theory focuses on the underlying factors of bad governance as 
the source of instability and root cause of the insurgency.  
 
Building or restoring legitimacy thus becomes the way to achieve 
one’s desired ends. Legitimacy, according to the field manual, is to be 
achieved through a balanced application of both military and nonmili-
tary means. This is because military means alone can only address the 
symptoms of a loss of legitimacy and not restore or enhance the legit-
imacy necessary to achieve durable peace. The field manual lists six 
possible indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyze threats to 
stability:24 
 
(i) Ability to provide security for the populace (ii) Selection of leaders 
that are considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the popu-
lace (iii) High level of popular participation in or support for political 
processes (iv) Culturally acceptable level of corruption (v) Culturally 
acceptable level and rate of political, economic and social develop-
ment (vi) High level of regime acceptance by major social institutions 
 
These indicators are deemed important to achieve the support of a suf-
ficient majority of the population. Although different societies and 
cultures may put different emphasis on the various indicators, these 
indicators point to the need for security, elections and welfare for the 
population and consequently also reform of governance. As such, 
COIN is as much about state-building and social re-engineering as it is 
about fighting the enemy. ‘Counter-insurgents aim to enable a country 
                                                 
20  FM 3-24, p. 51. 
21  FM 3-24, p. 2. 
22  FM 3-24, p. 37. 
23  FM 3-24, pp. 37-8. 
24  FM 3-24, p. 38. 
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or regime to provide the security and rule of law that allow establish-
ment of social services and growth of economic activity’.25   
 
Since ‘the primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster devel-
opment of effective governance by a legitimate government’, 26 the 
focus in COIN is not control of territory or purely the destruction on 
the enemy’s capacity to fight, but for the ‘minds’ of the population.  
Thus the activities of the foreign intervening forces must serve to alter 
the population’s perception of the government through reforming its 
governance capacity. This means that the relationship between the in-
tervening forces, the government, and the population in large part will 
determine how legitimacy is perceived. In this sense, it is vital that the 
intervening forces communicate and interact with the Host Nation 
population in order to determine what they define as effective and le-
gitimate governance and that all commanders must consider how op-
erations contribute to strengthening Host Nation’s legitimacy. If the 
demands of the population, be it security, welfare or elections, are met 
by the government, legitimate control can be achieved, if not, legiti-
macy is at risk. ‘In the end, [the population] determine the ultimate 
victor’.27 
 
The field manual’s approach to countering an insurgency – often 
termed population-centric COIN for its focus on the population – uses 
military force to foster the conditions for long-term economic devel-
opment and good governance in order to make the central government 
of a Host Nation legitimate in the eyes of the general population.  
 
Population-centric COIN is often conducted through what the field 
manual call a clear-hold-build operation that has three objectives; cre-
ate a secure physical and psychological environment by clearing out 
the insurgents, establish firm government control over the populace 
and area by holding territory (preferably by Host Nation government 
security forces) and gain the populace’s support by building up sup-
port for the Host Nation government through delivering essential ser-
vices. This approach aims at developing a long-term effective Host 
Nation government framework that secures the people and their basic 
needs which will thus reinforce the government’s legitimacy.28 By 
controlling key areas, security and influence will then spread out into 
other areas.29 ‘Clear-hold-build objectives require lots of resources 
and time. The US and HN commanders should prepare for a long-term 
effort.’30 
                                                 
25  FM 3-24, p. 2. 
26  FM 3-24, p. 37. 
27  FM 3-24, p. 38. 
28  FM 3-24, pp. 174-84. 
29  This is sometimes referred to as the ‘ink-spot strategy’.  
30 FM 3-24, p. 175. 
12      Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, Karsten Friis and Harald Håvoll 
 
COIN is a political-military struggle, and although military efforts are 
necessary and important to COIN it is only effective when integrated 
into a shared strategy with the other elements of national power, mak-
ing unity of effort an essential element.31 While COIN is not primarily 
a military fight ‘controlling the level of violence is a key aspect of the 
struggle’, as a ‘more benign security environment allows civilian 
agencies greater opportunity to provide their resources and exper-
tise’.32 This makes the military an enabling factor in COIN – not a so-
lution in its own right – as without security few other lines of opera-
tion can be initiated or sustained. David Galula’s ‘formula’ of 20% 
military and 80% civilian effort in COIN is not to be taken literally 
but rather as an indication of the resources and efforts needed over 
time to produce a sustainable stability.33 At certain times and in cer-
tain areas the military effort will be the main one with civilian efforts 
in support. In other areas and at different times the opposite will be the 
situation. FM 3-24 states that the military effort is a combination of 
offensive, defensive and stability operations and that the weight of 
each type of operation is at the commander’s discretion dependent on 
the situation and the mission.34 The purpose of the use of military 
force in COIN according to FM 3-24 is not to defeat the insurgency by 
killing as many insurgents as possible but to create legitimacy through 
protection of the population and to enable development and rule of 
law. As such, the ‘counter-insurgents take upon themselves responsi-
bility for the people’s well-being’.35 The underlying logic can be rep-
resented by a metaphor: ‘If you have a mosquito problem the solution 
lies in the swamp – not in swapping as many mosquitoes as possible’. 
As Bernard Fall argued almost 50 years ago, ‘when a country is being 
subverted it is not being outfought; it is being out-administered’.36 
This means that the fight is really a competition over government and 
not about who can outfight the other. 
 
According to FM 3-24 military forces contribute to the legitimacy of 
the Host Nation government by providing security to the population.37 
The most cost effective way of achieving this is by securing the main 
population centres. In order to build legitimacy the use of force must 
be constrained, proportionate and discriminate. The idea is that collat-
eral damage has a more negative impact on legitimacy than the posi-
                                                 
31  FM 3-24, p. 39. 
32  FM 3-24, p. 54. 
33  David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964, reprint, Westport, 
Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2006), p. 63.  
34  FM 3-24, p. 34.  
35  FM 3-24, p. 55. 
36  Bernard B. Fall, ‘The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency’, Naval 
War College Review (Winter 1998, reprinted from April 1965 issue), Vol.1, No. 1, pp.53-
54. (emphasis in original) 
37  FM 3-24, p. 38. 
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tive effect the impression of strength has. In order to achieve precise 
effect by military force, timely and correct intelligence is paramount. 
In order to get to such information the analysts must understand the 
local context – in particular the so-called ‘human terrain’. This collec-
tion of actionable intelligence in turn requires the forces to interact 
with the local population thus increasing the risk to the troops. The 
close interaction with the people also enhances the legitimacy of the 
COIN forces as the COIN forces’ safety becomes the people’s safety – 
and vice versa.  
 
In addition to this, the field manual ascribes stability operations – civil 
security, civil control, essential services, governance, and economic 
and infrastructure development – as a vital part of the COIN effort in 
order to gain legitimacy for the Host Nation government. Although 
these are mainly civilian tasks it is expected that military forces con-
tributes either in support or when civilian expert not available to un-
dertake many of these tasks, themselves. As such, the field manual 
states that ‘Soldiers and Marines are expected to be nation builders as 
well as warriors’.38 
COIN and its Critics 
Although COIN as the guiding principle for the operation was not im-
plemented until the arrival of General Stanley McChrystal in June 
2009,39 COIN has been widely criticised after the limited success in 
Afghanistan. The apparent failure to provide victory or basic security 
in the country after a decade of fighting indicates a significant fault, 
but whether it is the implementation of the COIN doctrine or the doc-
trine itself which is at fault in Afghanistan is a moot question. While it 
is commonly understood that many aspects of the implementation has 
been flawed, due to limited resources, coalition-related caveats, re-
sistance to the doctrine etc., several critics have also concluded that 
the doctrine and the entire COIN theory has been proven wrong. 
 
Some of the critique of the doctrine has been aimed at the limited 
scope of historical cases it is based on, and that both older and newer 
conflicts not presently included should inform a revision of the doc-
trine. The COIN theory adopted by FM 3-24 is primarily based on 
case-studies from the Cold War – in particular Malaya, Algeria and 
Vietnam as presented through the seminal works of David Galula, 
Roger Trinquier, Frank Kitson, John Nagl and others. This critique of 
the background and production of the doctrine have some merit. The 
cases referred to are too homogenous as the sole basis of a general 
                                                 
38  FM 3-24, Foreword. 
39  For General Stanley McChrystal’s COIN approach to the war in Afghanistan see for in-
stance Stanley McChrystal, COMISAF USFOR-A Counterinsurgency Training Guidance, 
Headquarters USFOR-A/ISAF, Kabul, Afghanistan, Memorandum 10 November 2009. 
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theory of COIN. They all took place within the same limited time 
frame (1950s to 1975), within the same geo-political setting (the Cold 
War) and within similar local political settings (an insurgency against 
a colonial or puppet rule countered by external forces). The dilemma 
for the writers of doctrine is however, that the more specific the doc-
trine is the more it is relevant only to a limited spectrum of scenarios. 
The more wide-encompassing and general the doctrine the more it 
risks being relevant to none. Sebastian L.v. Gorka and David Kilcul-
len simply states that this dilemma cannot be solved within one uni-
fied doctrine: ‘(...) it becomes evident that a single unified counter-
insurgency doctrine is not possible, that there can be no universal set 
of best practices evolved over time that can cover such diverse starting 
points, end-states, and local context’.40 
 
The critics of the doctrine’s recommendations can be roughly divided 
into two groups. On one hand, there are the ones that agree with the 
overall tenets of population-centric  COIN as described in the field-
manual, but see flaws in the theory and argue for revising the manual, 
especially with regards to new empirical evidence from Iraq and Af-
ghanistan and other historical case-studies. On the other hand are 
those arguing for a so-called enemy-centric approach who argues that 
the population-centric COIN approach is flawed and that the focus 
should be on the insurgents, not the insurgency.   
 
In the following section we will discuss some of the critique of the 
COIN-theory based primarily on the Afghanistan experience, and the 
alternative approaches that are being launched. It is not a discussion of 
all the things that have gone wrong in Afghanistan, but on those as-
pects the critics emphasise to conclude that COIN has proven wrong. 
Revising Population-Centric COIN 
The first type of critique can be roughly divided into two parts. Firstly, 
it is claimed that the concept of legitimacy is too Western centric, 
founded on what the West view as universal norms, based on the 
rights of the individual over the community as a form of social con-
tract between the ruler and the ruled. Rather than being based on uni-
versal values and norms, the critics claim, the foundation of legitima-
cy is found in the specific culture of the society in question.41 
 
                                                 
40  Sebastian L.v. Gorka and David Kilcullen, ‘An Actor-centric Theory of War: Understand-
ing the difference between COIN and Counterinsurgency’, Joint Forces Quarterly, Issue 
60, 1st Quarter 2011, p.16 
41  See for instance Robert Egnell, ‘Winning “Hearts and Minds”? A Critical Analysis of 
Counter-Insurgency Operations in Afghanistan’, Civil Wars, vol. 12, no. 3 (2010), pp. 
282-303 
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This critique can be illustrated by the six indicators of legitimacy in 
the field manual mentioned above. Concepts such as popular selection 
of leaders and ‘high level of participation in political processes’ are 
typically based on Western liberal democratic ideas. They are relative-
ly irrelevant in most of the places in which Western militaries have 
fought insurgencies over the past decades. Although the manual men-
tions different forms of legitimacy, this is not sufficiently being cov-
ered as it only spends a paragraph on explaining different forms of 
legitimacy. If different cultures and societies have different forms of 
legitimacy and subsequently a different way of achieving legitimacy, 
this is of paramount importance to the manual as it places legitimacy 
as the primary objective in COIN. In addition, imposing Western 
norms and values on societies may not only be difficult in practice, 
but may in fact be counter-productive as it can offend the locals and 
thus serve to delegitimize the counter-insurgents or upset traditional 
power balances that can lead to more instability. 
 
Moreover, the field manual assumes that the population will accept 
the form of central authority as legitimate as long as it provides the 
population with what they deem are their needs. In this way, the FM 
only offers benefits to the society as a method of gaining legitimacy. 
This rational social contract model, where the state buys legitimacy by 
providing services, ignores the host of other mechanism through 
which legitimacy is built and maintained in most societies. Further-
more, such a form of legitimacy may only work as long as the external 
forces are present and able to meet local expectations. It can thus be 
seen as an artificial form of legitimacy that may prove unstable when 
the external involvement eventually comes to an end. If legitimacy is 
purely built on providing benefits in a conflict situation, a new legiti-
macy system based on traditional norms and values may resurface 
when violence fade. Another problem is the way the military forces 
have gone about building this legitimacy. There are many examples of 
cases where winning ‘hearts and minds’ have meant handing out toys 
to kids or conducting Quick Impact (QIP) programmes, aimed at 
short-term popularity-boosts and force protection, but which simulta-
neously have undermined long-term development programmes.42 It is 
also unlikely that it has contributed in any way to the standing of local 
authorities among the population. 
 
Another problem with the focus on legitimacy is the problem it creates 
for the intervening forces to actually enhance or create legitimacy for 
the HN government or the local people. The perceived legitimacy of 
                                                 
42 Andrew Wilder and Gordon Stuart, ‘Money Can’t Buy America Love’, Foreign Policy 
(December 1, 2009), Available at 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/12/01/money_cant_buy_america_love?hidec
omments=yes, Accessed 25.07.2012 
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the intervening force – a function of the intervening force’s conduct, 
identity and ability to meet local expectations – is thus vital to 
COIN.43 If the external forces that are supposed to gain legitimacy for 
the HN government are seen as illegitimate in the eyes of the popula-
tion, the whole task may prove to be futile. Furthermore, time is rarely 
on the intervening actors’ side. Eventual popular support from the lo-
cal populace tends to be reduced over time even in the most permis-
sive environments. If this is the case, building legitimacy for a third 
part may be extremely challenging. If the HN government is seen as 
working with the illegitimate intervening forces, they will also be 
deemed illegitimate and thus the only way to achieve some sort of or-
der will be through the use of overwhelming coercion which the field 
manual explicitly consider to be unstable.  
 
Secondly, it is claimed that the field manual is too reliant on a central 
state as basis for governing the society.44 In relation to Afghanistan, a 
country in which legitimacy rarely have been centralized, the critics 
claim that the government centric idea of legitimacy is entirely 
flawed. Instead, legitimacy flows from religion, ethnicity, clan and 
tribe and other forms of local allegiance, something that has largely 
been ignored in the field manual. Hence, it is claimed that a bottom-up 
up approach focused on local governance rather than the central gov-
ernment have greater chance of succeeding. This approach agrees with 
the field manual that legitimacy should be the main objective, but ra-
ther than focusing on building legitimacy for the central government 
in the eyes of the population, the focus should be on getting the popu-
lation on your side by providing them with local level governance that 
are deemed acceptable to them. To the proponents of this approach, 
COIN can work in the absence of a legitimate HN central government 
as long as the local authorities are deemed legitimate. In Afghanistan 
for instance, the central government is seen as corrupt and incapable 
of providing the population with security and essential services on the 
local level, making it impossible to gain the legitimacy needed for 
success according to the field manual.45  
 
In addition to this, the general population may be largely irrelevant in 
order to achieve stability as a result of legitimacy. ‘If counter-
insurgency is, in the final analysis, about which side has the greatest 
legitimacy, then we cannot simply measure that legitimacy as a func-
tion of political recognition by the majority of the population’.46 In 
                                                 
43  Mats Berdal, Building Peace after War (London: IISS, Routledge, 2009), p. 98. 
44  See for instance William Rosenau, (2009), ‘Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Iraq and 
Afghanistan’, Harvard International Review, vol. 31, no.1 (Spring 2009), pp.52-56 
45  David C.Ellis, and James Sisco, ‘Implementing COIN Doctrine in the Absence of a Legit-
imate State’, Small Wars Journal, 13 October, 2010, Available at 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/implementing-coin-doctrine-in-the-absence-of-a-
legitimate-state, Accessed on 25.07.2012 
46  Gorka and Kilcullen (2011), p. 17. 
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societies where the central government has based its rule on coercion 
or there have been no central government, allegiances to leaders of a 
tribe, clan, ethnicity or religion are likely to be a much stronger foun-
dation of legitimacy. If legitimacy flows from other allegiances, this 
has to be taken into account and different approaches to achieving this 
must be examined.  
Enemy-Centric Approach to COIN 
In general, the enemy-centric group is critical of COIN due to what 
they see as an overambitious strategy to build states and re-engineer 
entire societies to achieve the political objectives. US Army Colonel 
Gian P. Gentile, for instance, argues that COIN has become such a 
dominant way of thinking in the American military that they do not 
see any other more limited ways of dealing with instability and insur-
gencies, leading the US Army into never-ending campaigns of nation-
building and attempts to change entire societies to achieve the loyalty 
of populations.47 This, the critics claim, is too costly in both blood and 
treasure and has achieved very little success over the past decade. 
Moreover, they attack what they see as a very narrow and flawed un-
derstanding of war and warfare claiming that the field manual’s view 
of insurgencies as caused by bad governance is not necessarily accu-
rate and may indeed not be the cause of many insurgencies. Limiting 
the understanding of causes of insurgencies to bad governance runs 
the risk of neglecting that the conflict may be a result of other factors 
such as, ethnic antagonisms, ideological disputes, old-fashioned power 
struggles or simple greed and that it may be that the real challenge 
comes from the adversary and not from inability to provide the popu-
lation with certain services. Indeed, if history is an indicator, success-
ful counter-insurgency campaigns have rarely been won by ‘out-
administer’ the insurgents, but by outfighting them.48 
 
The proponents of enemy-centric COIN argue for a more narrow ap-
proach that focuses on the insurgents rather than the insurgency, the 
enemy rather than the population. This they claim is not only the most 
cost-effective way of doing a counter-insurgency operation, but also 
the one that is most likely to bring success. For them, legitimacy is 
thus not a way to stability as the population-centrists would argue, but 
rather a bi-product or consequence of killing the insurgents in the first 
place. Also, unless the government can demonstrate the ability to se-
cure and control its population, well-meaning efforts to appear legiti-
mate are likely to fail as security is of primary concern to the popula-
                                                 
47  Gian P. Gentile, ‘A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army’, Pa-
rameters, (Autumn 2009), pp.5-17 
48  Bernard Finel, ‘A Substitute for Victory’, Foreign Affairs, (8 April 2010), Available at 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66189/bernard-finel/a-substitute-for-victory, Ac-
cessed on 25.07.2012 
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tion. As such, stability does not flow from legitimacy, but the other 
way around. A focus on the causes of violence rather than the causes 
of the insurgency allows the enemy-centric approach to argue for a 
more limited end-state. Thus stability become and end in itself, rather 
than a way to an end and subsequently that reform of governance and 
societal re-engineering should be processes separate from COIN.  
 
To be fair, the FM 3-24 gives consideration to the idea that the ability 
of the state to provide security to population can give it enough legit-
imacy to govern in the people’s eyes. However, the field manual ex-
plicitly state that coercive states are inherently unstable in the long run 
and thus stability based on coercion may only be short-lived.  
Critique of the Use of Military Force in COIN 
In his seminal book The Logic of Violence in Civil War, Stathis 
Kalyvas, argues that people, irrespective of their pre-war sympathies 
‘prefer to collaborate with the political actor that best guarantees their 
survival rather than defect by helping the rival actor’. In war-torn so-
cieties where the population’s primary concern is security, control is 
likely to shape collaboration because political actors who enjoy sub-
stantial territorial control can protect civilians in that territory giving 
survival oriented civilians a strong incentive of collaboration irrespec-
tive of their initial preferences. As such, military resources generally 
trump pre-war political and social support in spawning control. This 
means that collaboration is largely endogenous of control and that the 
two are self-reinforcing as more collaboration leads to greater control 
and so on. Through control, political actors try to shape popular sup-
port and deter collaboration with their rivals.49 However, if collabora-
tion is endogenous of control, the question of how to gain control in 
the first place arises. 
 
Kalyvas insight that support follows strength is important for both 
proponents and critics of COIN.50 Kilcullen for instance uses this idea 
to argue for a theory of competitive control – ‘whoever does better at 
establishing a resilient system of control, that gives people order and a 
sense of security where they sleep, is likely to gain their support and 
ultimately win the competition for government.’51 By protecting the 
population under rule of law, one will increase collaboration and deter 
defection and ultimately win the competition for governing the people. 
However, Kalyvas argues, ‘the military resources that are necessary 
                                                 
49  Stathis N. Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War (Cambridge/New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2005), pp. 12-3. 
50  For an enemy-centric view see William F. Owen, ‘Killing Your Way to Control’, The 
British Army Review, no. 151 (Spring 2011), pp.34-37. For a more population-centric 
view, see Kilcullen (2010), pp. 152-54 
51  Kilcullen (2010), p. 152. 
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for the imposition of control are staggering and, hence usually lacking, 
(…) and rival actors are therefore left with little choice but to use vio-
lence as a means to shape collaboration.’52 This argument is often 
used by the proponents of the enemy-centric approach arguing that 
even if we had the resources, or more importantly the political will to 
use the resources required to protect the population in a counter-
insurgency operation, this would be too costly, and should be avoided. 
Thus, we should not conduct these operations by focusing on passive-
ly protecting the population to increase collaboration, but rather ac-
tively focus on the insurgents, ‘killing your way to control’. As Wil-
liam F.  Owen argues, protecting the population ‘should not be the ac-
tivity, but should be the benefit from destroying the enemy’.53 There-
fore, the arguments goes, going after the enemy will showcase the 
strength of our forces to the population and thereby gain collaboration 
as the population understand that we can best guarantee their survival.  
 
Earlier studies have shown that targeting the insurgency or a terrorist 
organization’s leadership through kill or capture missions have little 
or even negative effect. However, more recent studies seems to con-
tradict this, and shows that removing insurgent leaders increases gov-
ernments’ chances of defeating insurgencies because they increase the 
mortality rates of the insurgent groups when experienced commanders 
are lost, leading to reduced insurgent attacks, and diminishing overall 
levels of violence.54 These arguments have some merit particularly 
when targeting the military leaders of the insurgency. It takes years of 
combat experience to produce an effective military commander but it 
takes only limited training for a foot soldier to do simple insurgency 
work. Led by an experienced commander these foot soldiers can oper-
ate as a fairly competent combat unit while they might have close to 
no combat effectiveness with an inexperienced one. In addition to the 
effect of diminished combat effectiveness there is also the possible 
effect of ‘support following strength’. When the population see that 
the counter-insurgency forces are able to eliminate core insurgent 
commanders and thereby reduce the overall levels of violence some 
individuals will be inclined to collaborate with the counter-insurgents, 
rather than the insurgents.   
 
The problem with this enemy-centric approach however, as Kalyvas 
points out, is that the effective use of violence to establish control is 
highly dependent on applying force selectively. ‘Indiscriminate vio-
lence is of limited value since it decreases the opportunity costs of col-
laboration with the rival actor’,55 thereby providing an intent for the 
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population to passively of actively support the other side. The so-
called ‘Night-raids’ in Afghanistan are illustrative of the unintended 
effects of kill and capture operations. Despite their obvious success in 
hunting down and killing or capturing insurgents (about 1,500 insur-
gents killed or captured by early 2011 and 80% of the night raids were 
conducted without firing a shot), the raids enraged neighbours and lo-
cals.56 According to the Pasthun social code, the Pasthunwali, one 
who intrudes on a man’s property uninvited is doing so either to rob or 
to dishonour the person, and Pashtuns are obliged to come to his assis-
tance. On some occasions neighbours rushing to the scene to help 
have been shot by the SOFs because they were suspected of being fel-
low Taliban. The embarrassment and perceived humiliation has prob-
ably driven several locals into the Taliban camp. This negative effect 
of the night-raids may have been the trigger behind the spring 2012 
agreement between the Karzai Government and the US that all night-
raids in the future should either be led or approved by Afghan authori-
ties. 
 
The dilemma is that selective violence is dependent on information 
from the populace in order to capture or kill the insurgents, something 
that is difficult to obtain if one does not have control. Individuals only 
want to provide information when it is safe for them to do so as they 
are trying to maximize their chances of survival. The paradox is that 
political actors do not need to use violence in areas where they have 
control, and cannot use selective violence in areas of no control, hav-
ing no or limited access to information.57 This dilemma makes the en-
emy-centric approach difficult to operationalize.   
 
Although both the proponents and critics of COIN agree that control is 
vital, they do not agree on how to achieve this. A compromise of the 
two approaches, and one that gains increasingly support within the US 
establishment, is what has been dubbed ‘COIN lite’.58 This approach 
to counter-insurgency is more limited as its focus is on stability and 
does not have state-building component within it. Within such a hy-
brid approach the focus is on offensive operations by Special Opera-
tion Forces (SOF) against insurgents and with regular forces primarily 
doing Foreign Internal Defence (FID), training and mentoring of Host 
Nation's own security forces. The idea is to let the Host Nation gov-
ernment be responsible for the protection of its population while more 
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competent SOFs do the hunting and capturing/killing of insurgents. 
This, they argue, will provide Host Nation with more visibility and 
ownership of the struggle and reduce the negative effect of foreign 
troops seen as ‘occupiers’. It also significantly reduces the required 
force levels by external forces making the engagement more palatable 
for the external force’s domestic audience (politicians and population 
in general), a point that has largely been neglected in the COIN field 
manual. In addition, it reduces the risk to the regular external forces 
thus making it easier for the political leadership in the troop-
contributing countries to stay the course.  
 
The problem with this approach is that it takes very long time do FID 
and can thus only work if one is extremely proactive towards the in-
surgency and acts before it is able to gain the momentum. This could 
work if one is able to muster enough political support for early in-
volvement in conflicts, but this is challenging. If a full-fledged insur-
gency is underway, a ‘COIN-lite’ approach is less likely to succeed as 
one would not necessarily be able to fend off the insurgents risking the 
need to escalate and thereby be dragged into the conflict with a much 
larger presence. This is much like what happened in Vietnam. 
 
The polarizing debate between the population-centrists and the ene-
my-centrists is may be a result of arguing from two different analyti-
cal perspectives. As Kalyvas notes, ‘asking what causes a civil war is 
not the same as asking what causes violence within a civil war.’59 
While the population-centric group focuses on the causes of the insur-
gency, and thereby views the solution to the insurgency as reform and 
strengthening of governance, the enemy-centric advocates focuses on 
the causes of the violence, the insurgents, and thus argues for a nar-
rower end-state, stability. The different starting points for arguing 
their case, leads to different end states and the ways and means of 
achieving these. Clearing up this confusion may be a way to bring the 
two groups closer and reinvigorate the debate about COIN.  
Towards a Revised COIN Theory: A Stakeholder-Centric  
Approach 
The population-centric versus enemy-centric debate is deeply polariz-
ing and has led to a stalemate that is hampering any intellectual pro-
gress on how to counter insurgencies. While the enemy-centric pro-
moters have raised a lot of good arguments about the problems with 
the field manual and COIN theory in general, relying primarily on go-
ing after the enemy is a very narrow approach that favours short-term 
gains over long-term efforts to secure a durable peace that is necessary 
for long-term stability.  
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If the aim of all wars should be a ‘better peace’, it means, as Beatrice 
Heuser argues, that a Clausewitzian brutal imposition of ones will up-
on the enemy is ‘unlikely to lead to a lasting peace, unless the enemy 
is annihilated (…) A peace with which the defeated side cannot live in 
the long term will necessarily engender a new war to reverse the situa-
tion’.60 Since annihilation of the enemy is not a realistic option for 
Western governments, due to moral considerations, a negotiated peace 
that all the belligerents can live with is, in most cases, the best solu-
tion one can get out of a COIN operation. Gorka and Kilcullen support 
this view in their study of numerous different insurgencies, noting that 
a government usually wins if they are eventually prepared to negotiate 
with its non-state enemy.61 An intervening force needs to consider the 
social cohesion of a state and what can plausibly be constructed from 
the old order. The more sweeping the destruction of the existing order 
(short of total annihilation of one side) and the more fragmented a so-
ciety grows, the more difficult establishment of domestic order is like-
ly to be. Although a negotiated solution with insurgents and others 
may not be in line with the norms and values of Western liberal de-
mocracies, such an outcome is most likely to benefit the population as 
it may end the violence quicker than a legitimacy or war fighting con-
test.  
 
If the populations-centric approach is too ambitious and the enemy-
centric approach unsustainable, what would then be the solution for 
future COIN operations? How can we find a middle ground which 
does not require unrealistically high political investments in resources 
for military forces, development aid and long-term state-building ef-
forts, while simultaneously recognises that a security and peace re-
quires a certain degree of political legitimacy to be sustainable?  
 
While both the proponents and critics of COIN have their merits, they 
do not disentangle the difficult question on how to build peace after 
war, which should be of paramount importance in any counterinsur-
gency. In other words, what is it that keeps the weapons silent also 
after the secession of hostilities? 
 
To answer this, we may turn to the peace-building/state-building liter-
ature. Insights from these studies have tended to be neglected in the 
counter-insurgency literature, but it draws on experiences from many 
conflicts and may offer some relevant clues, even if not explicitly ad-
dressing counter-insurgencies. The question on how to build peace 
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after war is after all a key component in any kind of warfare. Just as in 
COIN, state-building is regarded as a key element for success. This 
has emerged over the last decades so that state-building has become 
an integral part of peace-building. When the UN revised its approach 
to peace-keeping and peace-building in 2001, Kofi Annan, then Secre-
tary General of the UN, stated that peace becomes sustainable ‘not 
when all conflicts are removed from society, but when the natural con-
flicts of society can be resolved peacefully through the exercise of 
state sovereignty and, generally, participatory governance.’62 In the 
academic literature state-building is considered to be a particular ap-
proach to peace-building, ‘premised on the recognition that achieving 
security and development in societies emerging from civil war partly 
depends on the existence of capable, autonomous and legitimate gov-
ernment institutions’.63 This is often labelled as ‘liberal-peace’, in oth-
er words that a liberal economy and political system are preconditions 
for lasting peace. Simply put, through representative institutions and a 
free economy, conflicts are expected to be resolved peacefully. Build-
ing these institutions thus becomes a central tenet of peace-building.  
 
However, the literature is critical to the merits of much of the liberal 
state-building efforts, due to mixed results, tendencies to create ‘neo-
imperial’ relationships and ‘cultures of dependencies’, as well as in-
clinations to ‘one size fits all’ and Western-based ‘templates’ to good 
governance and institution building.64 Furthermore, while democracy 
may be regarded as the most stable way of governance, the process of 
democratization has often turned out to destabilize fragile peace 
agreements instead of cementing them.65  
 
This is a vast literature, but in the following we will primarily draw on 
two texts which are relevant for the current discussion, Mats Berdal’s 
Building Peace after War and Alex de Waal’s Mission without end? 
Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace.66 To begin with, 
one can note that there are often clear similarities between the critique 
leveraged against COIN and critique against peace-building, such as 
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the Western state-template which is being promoted. Berdal argues 
that approaches to peace-building have: 
 
... displayed a marked tendency to abstract the task of peace-building from their 
political, cultural and historical context … The result has been an ahistorical and 
static view of the challenges posed to outside intervention in war-torn societies 
and a consequent failure to take account of the variety of ways in which the past 
constraints, shapes and imposes limits on what outsiders can realistically 
achieve. This tendency has encouraged a social-engineering approach to the con-
cept of peace-building. External actors have failed to gauge the extent to which 
their own actions, policies and historical baggage necessarily contribute to shap-
ing the ‘post-conflict environment’, whether through the stirring of nationalisms 
or through the legimisation or delegimisation of indigenous power structures, or 
by empowering or disempowering what are, for better or worse, key local ac-
tors.67 
 
By switching the word peace-building with COIN and placing this text 
in the context of Afghanistan, one gets a pretty good picture of what 
has gone wrong in our efforts to stabilize and bring peace to the coun-
try. 
 
Furthermore, Berdal presents three priority tasks for an outside inter-
vening force – a secure environment, stabilization of governance 
structures and the provision of basic services – all of which are very 
similar to those advocated in the counter-insurgency field manual. 
Additionally, Berdal argues, the driving factor behind these activities 
should always be with the building of legitimacy, both for the inter-
vening forces and for the administrative and governance structures on 
which a durable peace depends. However, it is the lack of an under-
standing of the local context mentioned above, that has ‘too often 
doomed peace-building endeavours to ineffectiveness.’68 
 
According to Berdal, if there is one overarching lesson from the post-
conflict interventions in the 1990’s it is that stability cannot be im-
posed on war-torn societies from the outside. This is recognised in the 
COIN field manual as well, stating that ‘in the end, the host nation has 
to win on its own.’69 This is mainly due two factors; the limited politi-
cal will of intervening forces for an open-ended commitment any at-
tempt to impose durable peace would require and more importantly, 
limits to what can be imposed from the outside. Stability, Berdal ar-
gues, has to be elicited, and the key to this lies in the notion of legiti-
macy.70 For Berdal, it is vital that the governance structures put in 
place and promoted by the external forces command legitimacy in the 
eyes of the local parties, neighbouring states and the wider interna-
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tional community.71 Of these, local and regional legitimacy is of pri-
mary importance. The international community’s tendency to focus on 
central governments, creating power-sharing mechanisms in the capi-
tals combined with a ‘social engineering’ approach, has at times ig-
nored local power structures, tensions and overlooked potential alter-
native paths to peace. Institutional and governmental models that may 
appear legitimate and just from the outside may not be regarded so by 
those impacted by it. As pointed out by many analysts of peace-
building, domestic legitimacy is crucial.72 Another aspect Berdal 
points to is that interveners often conclude that absence of (central) 
government implies absence of governance. However, local forms of 
governance may very well be in place, notwithstanding the presence 
of formal government institutions.73 The very notion of a ‘failed state’, 
as it is often referred to in Western media and academia, presupposes 
a ‘state-template’ or a ‘functioning state’ to contrast it with. This is 
usually defined as a state with a potent central government, basic ser-
vices and institutions and monopoly of the use of force, in other words 
a Western-style Weberian state.74 The question is if intervening state-
builders or counter-insurgency fighters sufficiently take these local 
governing structures into account when looking for political end-
states. Political structures which emerge from existing forms of gov-
ernance rather than being imposed from outside, are more likely to be 
regarded as legitimate and thereby last longer. 
 
This is Alex de Waal’s starting point when he criticises the very idea 
of functioning state institutions as the core of peace-building. He 
questions if state-building in the Weberian sense is the right remedy 
for war-torn societies with limited historical experience with central-
ised states. He points out that ‘many of the world’s most difficult con-
flicts occur in countries where any such state institutions are subordi-
nate to social affinities and patronage networks, and are likely to re-
main so for the foreseeable future’.75 Wars in these places are not be-
tween hierarchically organized armies or groups, but loosely connect-
ed groups, held together through systems of loyalties and trade-offs. 
Neither rebels nor the government are not likely to be very disciplined 
or coordinated, but rather to ‘operate in the same way: using kinship 
and patronage, and licensing proxies’.76 The key for any political solu-
tion to the conflicts lies in these various relationships and their fluctu-
ating evolution. De Waal describes this as a ‘patrimonial market-
place’, governed by socio-cultural rules: 
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In the patrimonial political marketplace, the only semi-stable outcome is an in-
clusive buy-in of all elites by the best-resourced actor in the marketplace. Mili-
tary victories are rarely decisive. More often, members of the losing side quickly 
negotiate a lower price for their loyalty. The best outcome falls short of stability 
because all loyalties are provisional pending shifts in the value of allegiances in 
the political marketplace. It follows that a successful international peace en-
gagement will be one that supports the most inclusive and robust buy-in—one 
that is sufficiently well grounded in the relative value of the parties to survive the 
withdrawal of its international sponsors. 
 
The term marketplace thus turns politics into a trade, where loyalty 
and legitimacy is fragile and resting on various forms of balance of 
power and rational interests. This model applies both between regional 
leaders and ‘their’ population and between regional leaders and the 
central authorities.77 ‘Political life can be described as an auction of 
loyalties in which provincial elites seek to extract from one or other 
metropolitan centre the best price for their allegiance.’78 In this model 
legitimacy is vested in the relevant stakeholders or power brokers, not 
every individual citizen of the state. There are no notions of popular 
support of a central government, or loyalty emerging out of the provi-
sions of government services, as in the COIN field manual. On the 
contrary, de Waal argues that ‘in a weakly institutionalized country in 
which patrimony rules, any attempts to address supposed root causes 
such as injustice, lack of liberal democracy and unequal development 
may not help – or may even hinder – the achievement of more modest 
but realizable goals based on elite bargains’.79 
 
According to de Waal, the basic rules of political bargaining are sim-
ple: ‘Provincial elite members seek to maximize the price they can 
obtain for their loyalty from metropolitan elites (mostly govern-
ments)…. using the tools at their disposal, which include votes, ex-
tending or withdrawing economic cooperation, and the use of vio-
lence’.80 Using examples from, among others, Tanzania, Nigeria, Su-
dan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, de Waal argues that such 
bargaining is the most common way of resolving conflict in these so-
cieties. Since the political environment is so fluid in a marketplace 
stability cannot rest on formal institutions or justice systems. Loyalties 
shift so ‘peace must be made and kept on a retail basis’.81 
 
A crucial insight from these cases is that foreign-brokered peace ac-
cords may be less durable than a purely domestic one: ‘In a purely 
domestic bargaining exercise, the parties will approximate their true 
                                                 
77  de Waal (2009), focuses on the relationship between central authorities and local power 
brokers, but similar relationships are also present at the lower level. Any regional leader 
will face challengers and competitors he needs to relate to in a similar way as with the 
central authorities and other regional leaders. 
78  de Waal (2009), p. 103. 
79  de Waal (2009), p. 110. 
80  de Waal (2009), pp. 103-04. 
81  de Waal (2009),p. 110. 
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respective values and agree a price which reflects that’.82 This is not a 
‘give war a chance’ kind of argument, that wars should be allowed to 
conclude by themselves and the subsequent fatigue and exhaustion 
will be the best platform for sustainable peace.83 De Waal argues in 
favour of political solutions based on a trade-offs and legitimacy, not 
merely war-exhaustion. However, the presence and engagement by 
outsiders will always alter the local power-balance and distort the lo-
cal political marketplace. As a result, the exit of the foreigners – or the 
expectation thereof – will create waves of re-positioning and bargain-
ing. Less is therefore more when it comes to foreign engagement, and 
for the armed forces it is a good argument for keeping distance to lo-
cal politics – but never ignoring it or being unaware of it. The mere 
presence of foreign troops will impact on the market place, and the 
troops need to be aware of how, but that does not entail explicit en-
gagement in local brokering. As Kalyvas argues, ‘reducing violence 
requires as much local action as action at the centre. At least in the 
short and medium term, tinkering with local control could be a more 
efficient way to achieve peace and stability than investing in mass atti-
tudinal shift.… The allocation of troops and, especially, administrative 
resources should be based on a clear understanding of the local bal-
ance of control’.84 
 
Recognizing that military victories are unlikely to be decisive in such 
societies, de Waal provides us with an approach which retains the cru-
cial element of legitimacy recognized by COIN. However, instead of 
seeking to build legitimacy of the political system from every single 
individual (‘the population’), he focuses on the relevant stakeholders 
in the marketplace. And instead of building legitimacy through gov-
ernment structures and provision of services, he emphasizes the pow-
er-relationships between the stakeholders in the political marketplace. 
Conclusion  
By analysing COIN and its critics this article has sought to develop a 
revised theory of COIN in order to better inform future stability and 
counter-insurgency operations. In order to overcome the polarizing 
debate between the population-centric approach and the enemy-centric 
approach, this article has aimed at staking out a middle-ground be-
tween them. Through the insights offered from the peace-building lit-
erature we argue that a focus on stakeholders rather than the popula-
tion or the enemy in a counter-insurgency operation is more likely to 
succeed in bringing long-term peace and stability to war-torn coun-
tries. It shares with the populations-centric approach the recognition of 
                                                 
82  de Waal (2009), p. 109. 
83  Edward N. Luttwak, ‘Give War a Chance’, Foreign Affairs, vol. 78, no. 4 (1999), pp. 36-
44. 
84  Kalyvas (2005), p. 391. 
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political legitimacy for sustainable peace, but not that it should stem 
from the wider population. Furthermore, it shares with the enemy-
centric approach that intervening forces primary focus should be on 
the insurgents and not the insurgency, but that this is not a narrow fo-
cus on defeating the enemy, but rather on the use of military force in 
order to create the conditions that allow for a stable political order. 
Although the intervening forces should primarily play a military role 
and not be state-builders we argue that conclusive results cannot be 
achieved through military means alone, and that a negotiated solution 
to bring stability is the best way to ensure a durable peace. This means 
that the focus of all counter-insurgency operations should be on what 
comes after the end of violence. Although this approach offers no 
panaceas on how to go about countering insurgencies, some key in-
sights have been developed.  
 
Of primary importance is the need to understand that all insurgencies 
are sui generis – of its own kind – and that each one is filled with dif-
ferent incentives and disincentives for the continuation of violence. 
This means that there can be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to coun-
terinsurgencies and that a focus on both the causes of the insurgency 
and the drivers of the insurgents are vital for understanding the nature 
of the insurgency. Such an understanding is paramount to inform the 
counter-insurgents on how to create the conditions that will allow for 
a peace process.  
 
Understanding the nature of the insurgency and providing a solution to 
countering an insurgency is dependent upon what questions one asks. 
To paraphrase Kalyvas; asking what causes an insurgency is not the 
same as asking what causes violence within an insurgency. Whether 
one focuses on the causes of an insurgency or what causes the vio-
lence, one will get two very different answers that lead to different 
end- states and the ways and means of achieving this. The lack of a 
common starting point for debating COIN has, in many respects, lead 
to stalemate in furthering our understanding on how to counter an in-
surgency. Clarifying what can reasonably be expected to be achieved 
with the available resources is in many respects a good start.   
 
While agreeing with the enemy-centric approach that the proposed 
end-state of the population-centric approach is too ambitious, their 
narrow focus of defeating the enemy to achieve the limited end-state 
of stability will most likely not produce a lasting-peace. However, we 
agree that the focus of a counter-insurgency operation should be to 
facilitate a lasting stability and not a legitimate Host Nation govern-
ment able to secure and govern itself. As such, this article proposes an 
end-state as; a political agreement between the main stakeholders in 
the conflict that is regarded as legitimate and ensures stability that is 
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acceptable to all.85 The goal is to enable a political process that leads 
to an agreement between the main stakeholders that will allow the ex-
ternal forces to withdraw. Although this may seem like a very limited 
objective only focusing on ending hostilities and not aiming at reform-
ing the governance of society, it is paramount for an intervening force 
to consider the social cohesion of a state and what can plausibly be 
constructed from the old order. The more sweeping the destruction of 
the existing order, the more likely there is that the society will become 
fragmented and subsequently, the more difficult establishment of do-
mestic order is likely to be. Thus, this approach to counter-insurgency 
is aimed at consolidating the different factions in the conflict rather 
than an extensive re-engineering of the society. A counter-insurgency 
operation should therefore be stakeholder-centric, meaning that the 
focus of the effort should be on all the relevant military, political, so-
cial, religious etc. stakeholders in the society that may impact on a fu-
ture political agreement. This will help shoring up legitimacy of the 
political agreement while it does not require a full-scale COIN opera-
tion aimed at protecting the population and reforming governance.  
 
Building legitimacy through a political process is thus the way to 
achieve the ends in a stakeholder-centric approach. In this sense, legit-
imacy has to be thought of as what the stakeholders would most likely 
support or accept based on their standing in that particular society. 
Basing the political process on de Waal’s local political marketplace 
rather than a top-down imposed negotiation from the centre allows 
this process to be more legitimate and thus have a greater chance of 
bringing stability over the long-term.  
 
In stakeholder-centric COIN, the military objective is not limited to 
protecting the population or defeating the enemy but to facilitate a po-
litical process, adapted to the local political marketplace, that is 
deemed legitimate to all parties in the conflict. This means that the 
intervening forces military objective is to stop violent conflict and 
create the conditions for a political process. This is based on the ar-
gument that an intervening force can neither protect the population nor 
achieve unconditional surrender from the warring parties. Thus, a ne-
gotiated solution is the best one can hope for. 
 
Following on from Kalyvas, we argue that military force is instrumen-
tal in influencing the decision-making calculus of the different stake-
holders in order to compel them to enter into negotiation and eventual-
ly compromise. Compellence is military speak for uses of threats, or 
some degree of direct action to induce the opponent into giving up 
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30      Erik Reichborn-Kjennerud, Karsten Friis and Harald Håvoll 
 
what is desired,86 and create a desirable action. While deterrence, the 
other of the two sides of coercion, is concerned with maintaining the 
status quo and prevent change, compellence is more or less the oppo-
site, as it desires a change in the status quo or the return to the previ-
ously disrupted status quo. Because one is confronted with forces that 
already have changed the status quo, this is why compellence and not 
deterrence should be the main idea for the use of force in a stakehold-
er-centric approach to countering insurgencies. In this sense, military 
force becomes instrumental in changing the balance of power on the 
battlefield and induce action that is desirable to the peace process. 
This change in turn have to be followed up by a concrete plan of nego-
tiation that have to acknowledge the need to offer the stakeholders 
more than just an opportunity to disarm. Insights from the peace-
building literature and especially de Waals concept of the local politi-
cal marketplace, makes it possible to argue that such an approach 
should be the basis of any counter-insurgency operation.  
 
The problem here is that the balance of power is fragile. This means 
that an initial response to the insurgency will have to consider its ac-
tions carefully. As all belligerents in a conflict should be regarded as 
stakeholders, only supporting the Host Nation government against 
armed opposition would seriously hamper any later efforts at consoli-
dating peace through negotiations. The more you support one side, the 
less the chance of success. If one goes too far, the Host Nation gov-
ernment is likely to push for more compromises than the insurgent 
leaders would have been willing to accept had the situation on the 
ground been different. If a negotiated solution is made on these terms, 
it may not be lasting as it will not be accepted as legitimate by the 
stakeholders. The negotiated solution would have to be something all 
parties can live with in order for it to be sustainable and survive the 
withdrawal of external forces. As such, one need to take into account 
that the Host Nation government is part of the Host Nation stakehold-
ers and that the more you support one side the less chance of success. 
Also, as an external intervention into any conflict is based on national 
interests and one has to understand where one’s own objective over-
laps with the Host Nation stakeholders and where not. A carefully 
thought out strategy on how to achieve one’s own objectives accord-
ing to one’s interests is crucial at the start of the involvement. 
 
A stakeholder-centric approach can only work if the intervening forc-
es are able to overcome what Berdal argued was a lack of understand-
ing of the local context. If one is to influence and compel local stake-
holders in a conflict to engage in a peace process, a careful analysis, 
and especially the incentives and disincentives for violence of all the 
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stakeholders must be in place.  Without a proper appreciation of the 
political and socio-cultural context in which military force are being 
applied, this approach will be doomed to ineffectiveness.  
 
The lack of a clear strategy from the beginning of the American inter-
ventions in both Afghanistan and Iraq has encouraged a number of 
scathing critiques. The American Way of War has been critiqued for 
its ‘tactical and apolitical orientation’ as well as neglecting ‘the politi-
cal and socio-cultural context’ in which military force was used.87 In 
relation to what Antulio J. Echevarria II views as a narrow focus on 
defeating the enemy over achieving political goals, he argues that: 
 
... the new American way of war considers… post-conflict operations not as a 
part of war itself, but something belonging to its aftermath. This unhelpful dis-
tinction obscures the fact that the principal condition for strategic success in the 
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq was the establishment of a political (and to a cer-
tain extent an economic) order favourable to the United States. Failure to see the 
purpose for which a war is fought as part of war itself amounts to treating battle 
as an end rather than a means.88 
 
The failure of not having a clear strategy for consolidating the initial 
military success into political success in the two interventions contrib-
uted to the growing problem of insurgencies in both countries. The 
COIN field manual – that grew out of the chaos in Afghanistan and 
especially Iraq – can be seen as a reaction to the failure to see post-
conflict operations as part of war itself, and subsequently as an effort 
to amend some of this narrow focus by including stability operations 
and state-building as part of COIN. However, as the wars have 
dragged on, the field manual and its implementation have increasingly 
come under attack for being too ambitious and too costly. Instead, 
critics have increasingly turned back to the narrow approach of defeat-
ing the enemy, once again neglecting the post-war phase and over-
looking wars purpose – the creation of a ‘better peace’.  
 
Although strategy is difficult to do well,89 it remains crucial as it is the 
cornerstone for connecting political goals with military means. Thus 
the essence of operational art – translating the political and strategic 
aims into operational and tactical objectives – in any counter-
insurgency operation must be to create the conditions favourable to 
political order. This means that one must appreciate that the estab-
lishment of order is central for a strategic victory and must be viewed 
as part of war itself and that any use of force must be applied to attain 
political goals rather than tactical military aims. In a stakeholder-
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centric approach this means that a good strategy must account for a 
dynamic political context that can easily change when force is applied 
and an opponent with own options and goals, whose own behaviour 
are shaped by local political social and cultural norms.  
 
 
